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ABSTRACT 
Progressing from institutionalization to practice less than six years after its 
endorsement at the 2005 World Summit, the responsibility to protect (R2P) is a rising 
norm in international relations. This thesis uses the constructivist theoretical 
framework of Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) to determine which stage R2P has 
reached on the scale of international norm dynamics. This research is driven by an 
analysis of the political discourse held by the permanent members of the Security 
Council (P5) on R2P. This analysis results in a classification of the support brought 
to R2P by the P5 according to three distinct categories: strong supporters, cautious 
supporters, and rejectionists. While strong supporters advocate R2P in principle and 
practice, cautious supporters and rejectionists do not consider R2P as the standard 
procedure to protect civilians from crimes against humanity. This thesis argues that 
Russia and China are cautious supporters of R2P, as they oppose the norm’s 
implementation for conceptual reasons. Russian and Chinese concerns about R2P 
undermining core principles of the UN Charter result in the absence of consensus on 
the norm’s implementation within the Security Council. Acknowledging that this 
situation reduces the prospects of R2P implementation, analysis reveals that the 
norm has not reached the stage of internalization and is confined to the stage of 
norm cascade. The absence of rejectionists among the P5 is nonetheless indicative 
that R2P’s future internalization remains possible. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The responsibility to protect (R2P) is a United Nations principle enshrined in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document. According to paragraph 138 of the latter text, ‘each 
individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. Paragraph 139 further adds that ‘the 
international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means’ to protect civilian 
populations from the aforementioned crimes. Paragraph 139 continues by stating that the 
international community is ‘prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’ (UN General Assembly, 2005: A/RES/60/1).   
The adoption of the R2P principle is the result of a succession of debates that took 
place in the wake of humanitarian catastrophes in the 1990s such as Somalia, Rwanda, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Several new concepts were brought to the table by high-
profile politicians in order to propose new policies to protect civilians from mass atrocities. 
Notably, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested the idea that ‘individual 
sovereignty’ existed alongside the conventional concept of state sovereignty (Evans, 2008a: 
37). Francis Deng, former United Nations Secretary General representative on Internally 
Displaced Persons, attempted to pioneer a new model of humanitarian intervention which 
would not place state sovereignty at odds with the responsibility of states to guarantee its 
population a primary set of human rights. Francis Deng proposed to merge the principles of 
state sovereignty and the responsibility of states towards their population into the wider 
concept of R2P. As the title of his book, Sovereignty as Responsibility (Deng et al., 1996: 32-
3) aptly suggests, state sovereignty and R2P are two sides of the same coin.   
Francis Deng’s idea was further examined, debated, and elaborated with the help of 
official platforms such as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which informed the 
subsequent negotiations that preceded R2P’s adoption in New York in September 2005. This 
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occasion invited the 193 member states of the United Nations to reach a consensus on a 
variety of themes that were put on the agenda by Secretary General Kofi Annan. R2P was by 
far not the sole issue that was to be tackled at the World Summit. Themes such as institutional 
change within the UN system, including the enlargement of the Security Council, the setup of 
a Human Rights Council and the creation of an International Finance Facility, as well as 
environmental issues such as meeting the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
necessity to fight desertification were amongst the chief problems addressed at the Summit. 
(Hyvarinen, 2006: 6).  
In the aftermath of the 2005 World Summit, R2P encountered events that further 
legitimated the norm’s institutionalization within the United Nations system. In this way, the 
Security Council reaffirmed its commitment towards R2P in resolutions 1674 and 1894, voted 
respectively in 2006 and 2009. Finally, the appointment of Ban Ki-Moon as Secretary 
General confirmed that the trend of wide support for R2P that is to be found within the United 
Nations secretariat did not decrease as Kofi Annan’s mandate expired. The publication of a 
report titled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect by the current United Nations 
Secretary General clarified some aspects related to the manner in which R2P is to be put into 
practice by dividing it into three distinct pillars. Pillar one’s focus is on the primary 
responsibility of the state to protect its civilian population (Ban, 2009: 10). Pillar two 
emphasized the necessity to develop preventive efforts along with regional organizations, as 
well as improve international assistance and capacity-building mechanisms along the lines of 
early-warning systems (Ban, 2009: 15). Pillar three focuses on the international community’s 
timely and decisive response to R2P crimes (Ban, 2009: 22). 
Since then, humanitarian intervention on the grounds of R2P has been only authorized 
in the case of NATO’s operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. Importantly, this event 
constitutes the first time the use of force has been authorized by the Security Council by 
invoking R2P.  This thesis uses a constructivist theoretical perspective to determine the 
current situation of R2P’s normative progress. In this regard, it is interesting to observe 
whether the demonstration of R2P implementation in Libya altered the norm’s internalization 
prospects. This thesis aims to assess R2P’s stage of normative progress through the 
constructivist theoretical framework of the norm ‘life-cycle’. Developed by Finnemore & 
Sikkink (1998), this framework comprehensively integrates these inter-subjective features in a 
manner distinguishing three particular stages of norm dynamics in international relations. 
Accordingly, this theoretical framework offers the tools to measure to what extent R2P is a 
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norm ‘that set standard for the appropriate behavior of states’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 
891). This leads us to the following research questions. What is the current stage reached by 
R2P on Finnemore & Sikkink’s scale of international norm dynamics? Why has it reached 
this particular stage? 
This thesis will start by reviewing the scholarly debate on R2P and substantiate a gap 
within academic literature on the topic. Then, the theoretical framework surrounding this 
research will be outlined. The research design specifies the methodological aspects of this 
thesis and considers the hypotheses and expectations generated by this research. The 
empirical analysis determines the levels support brought by the permanent members of the 
Security Council to R2P. The interpretation of the empirical results concludes this thesis.   
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Chapter 2: Theory 
A) Literature Review 
R2P: a concept reconciling human rights and sovereignty  
The scholarly debate on R2P has been particularly active since the early 2000s.  The 
initial academic discussion focused on whether the latter event represented a positive 
development in the field of international politics. Academic interest concerning R2P grew 
most notably since 2001 and the ICISS’s report The Responsibility to Protect and even more 
since its adoption as a UN principle in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. On one 
hand, scholars perceive R2P as a positive development in international politics, particularly 
because they view it as a pioneering way to protect civilians against gross human rights 
violations without posing a threat to state sovereignty. Thakur (2004: 205) highlights that R2P 
offers clear guarantees towards the application of ‘precautionary principles, lawful 
authorization, and operational doctrine’ in the framework of humanitarian intervention. Weiss 
& Thakur (2011: 126) consider R2P’s conceptual advantages when they argue that R2P 
successfully allows for confronting human rights and state sovereignty so that the latter does 
not become a ‘license to kill’. Evans (2008a: 47) is equally positive on the substance of R2P’s 
conceptual implications asserting that the wording of Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World 
Summit Outcome Document, although slightly different from the pioneering reports of the 
ICISS and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, does not alter the 
significance of the core idea behind R2P. Bellamy (2009a) argues R2P is a pioneering 
concept in the fact that it encompasses economic, judicial, and diplomatic measures to assist 
states to successfully engage in their responsibility to protect their civilian population from 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Bellamy (2009a) adds 
that besides helping governments to protect their citizens from the four core crimes listed in 
the Rome Statute, R2P has the potential to increase the international community’s prospects 
for action   in these circumstances by institutionalizing support mechanisms within the United 
Nations system.  
R2P implementation: the need for further conceptualization 
Although R2P has been praised for its ability to create an international consensus 
around a new perspective on the implications of state sovereignty, it has also been criticized 
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for failing to address practical issues related to preventive and reactive action in situations of 
humanitarian distress. Bellamy (2006: 169) underlines that the successful implementation of 
R2P will depend on the development of clearer criteria concerning who should intervene, 
when the thresholds for intervention are reached, and what modes of operation are to be 
practiced. As the absence of specific criteria could provide leeway for R2P’s misuse by self-
serving actors, Bellamy (2009b: 125) also argues that further efforts need to be made in order 
to improve the concept’s implementation and convince skeptics that it is not a hoax for 
unilateral military intervention. This includes detailing the implications of prevention under 
R2P, emphasizing practical issues related to the protection of civilians, and proposing 
pragmatic yet non-coercive measures to put R2P into practice. Nevertheless, Bellamy & 
Williams (2011) consider these aspects to have been addressed in a consistent manner during 
the international community’s interventions in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011 so as to form 
a ‘new politics of protection’ conducted within the framework of the United Nations and in 
cooperation with regional organizations. 
Some scholars have nuanced R2P’s conceptual shortcomings by emphasizing that it 
still represents progress from the model of humanitarian intervention, which failed due to its 
excessive reliance on the political will of states to react to humanitarian crises. In this way, 
Cronogue (2012: 159) points out that although R2P does not put states under the strict 
obligation to intervene, R2P still represents ‘an important step in protecting civilians from 
government violence’. Jubilut (2012: 335) concurs by arguing that the adoption of R2P is a 
positive event in international politics because it demonstrates the international community’s 
interest in reacting to crimes against humanity perpetrated against civilians and it reduces the 
gap between the needs of civilian victims of such crimes and the institutional structure of the 
United Nations. 
Skepticism towards R2P’s ability to protect civilians 
Scholars critical of R2P argue that its institutionalization does not solve the issue of 
the lack of political will of states to intervene and does not propose solutions to address 
Security Council deadlock in R2P situations. Hehir (2011: 1341) is skeptical towards R2P’s 
failure to generate a ‘consistent, impartial response’ to protect civilians but concedes that R2P 
still allows the opportunity for the international community to increase political pressure on 
the Security Council to act. Furthermore, Chandler (2011: 32) argues that because it delegates 
some responsibilities to regional organizations and non-Western institutions, R2P 
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paradoxically represents a ‘shift away from responsibility’ for Western states seeking to 
decrease their role in peacekeeping operations by sharing the political, military, and economic 
costs of humanitarian intervention. Hamilton (2006: 296) adds that R2P’s implementation 
prospects are limited by a lack of operational capacity within international peacekeeping 
contingents. 
Darfur: a case illustrating R2P implementation difficulties 
Scholars critical of R2P (Belloni, 2006; Wheeler, 2009) use the example of the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur to expose the concept’s limitations. Belloni (2006: 333-334) 
argues that R2P’s flaws are that it proposes short-term reaction instead of long-term 
preventive solutions to humanitarian issues and that it provides incentives for rebel groups to 
prolong fighting in civil war contexts so as to attempt to obtain external support from the 
international community. Also with Darfur in mind, Wheeler (2009: 116) criticizes the lack of 
a common understanding of R2P, which reinforces the absence of political consensus to act 
on R2P grounds and is a factor of Security Council deadlock. Dharmapuri (2012: 242-243) 
has taken a similar viewpoint by recalling that these conceptual flaws result in an absence of 
consensus on R2P implementation even among the states supporting the concept.  From a 
different perspective, De Waal (2007: 1054) argues that the international community’s failure 
to protect civilians in Darfur from gross human rights violations is due to flaws in R2P’s 
conceptualization. In fact, De Waal (2007: 1043) highlights that the breadth of the R2P 
concept confused the international community’s humanitarian response in Darfur by 
multiplying uncoordinated objectives on the humanitarian, diplomatic, judicial, political and 
military fronts, which ‘impeded a clear and coherent strategy’. In the same way, Focarelli 
(2008) underlines that the R2P concept contains too many conceptual ambiguities to be 
successfully put into practice. Focarelli (2008: 210) argues that the amount of states objecting 
towards R2P renders the possibility to invoke humanitarian intervention on the grounds of 
this concept arbitrary. Furthermore, Focarelli (2008: 210) criticizes the fact that R2P 
conforms to the interests of the most powerful states in international politics since their 
military clout grants them the privilege to decide whether and how R2P is to be implemented.  
The emergence of a new international norm 
An important component of the academic debate concerning R2P is whether it has 
become an international norm. Scholars (Evans, 2008b: 286; Bellamy, 2011: 25; Thakur & 
Weiss, 2011: 142) who perceive R2P as a positive evolution in international relations use 
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normative terminology to describe R2P’s rise from an abstract idea to an international norm. 
Although conscious about the skepticism of a number of states concerning R2P, these 
scholars consider that R2P’s rapid process of institutionalization constitutes a normative 
evolution. In this way, these authors are similar in arguing that the process that turned the idea 
of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Deng et al., 1996: 32-3) into being conceptualized at the 
2001 ICISS, and then confirmed as a UN principle at the 2005 Word Summit led R2P to be 
accepted as a norm with international scope and influence. Karlsrud (2013: 15) highlights that 
donor states as well as the input of think tanks and academic circles assisted the UN in 
promoting R2P’s normative progress at the international level. In this way, Zähringer (2013: 
199-200) goes further by arguing that institutions such as the United Nations and the African 
Union were essential to guiding the interpretative divergences of states on R2P into further 
consolidating it as a norm as well as providing a regular platform for its socialization within 
the international community’s political discourse.  
Scholars (Rademaker, 2012; Welsh, 2013: 378-379; Ziegler, 2015: 18-19) have 
couched R2P’s normative evolution in the terms of Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998) norm ‘life-
cycle’ and argued that the institutionalization of R2P within the framework of the United 
Nations system resulted in R2P completing the stage of norm emergence and entering the 
stage of norm cascade.  Examining, the question from a legal standpoint, Matthews (2008: 
150) underlines that although R2P cannot yet be conceived as legally-binding, its 
implementation by the Security Council could turn what the author describes as currently 
being ‘a declaratory principle’ into ‘a binding norm of international law in the foreseeable 
future’. Moreover, Eaton (2010: 801) observes that although R2P is yet to become a binding 
rule of international law, the unanimous agreement of states on the core aspects of R2P 
creates a ‘heavy accumulated weight of opinio juris, both from opponents and advocates of 
responsibility to protect, that the Security Council should act in cases of mass atrocity 
crimes’.  
R2P: politicization, contestation and dissent  
Some scholars have considered R2P as mere political rhetoric and therefore unable to 
create an obligation for states to react in R2P situations. Stahn (2007) has issued firm 
criticism from a legal perspective. Following a textual analysis of paragraphs 138 and 139 of 
the World Summit Outcome document, the author argues that due to a lack of 
conceptualization and political will from UN member states, R2P remains for the moment a 
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declaratory principle as opposed to a legally binding norm. From a similarly legal standpoint, 
Loiselle (2013: 340) considers that despite having been implemented in the case of NATO’s 
intervention in Libya in 2011, the emergence of an opinio juris concerning the obligation for 
the Security Council to intervene to protect civilians in events of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing is exaggerated. In agreement with this statement, 
Garwood-Gowers (2013: 616) argues that the Security Council’s inaction in the light of the 
use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria illustrates that NATO’s intervention in 
Libya constitutes the exception rather than the norm as to what concerns civilian protection 
from crimes against humanity. Garwood-Gowers (2013: 617) conceives that, as witnessed in 
the case of Syria, protracted debates between the permanent members of the Security Council 
are likely to determine interventions on the grounds of R2P according on a ‘highly selective’ 
case-by-case basis and following a narrow interpretation of the criteria for action grounded in 
R2P.  
Academics have highlighted that the contestation of R2P by a number of non-Western 
states prevents its normative evolution towards full internalization. In this way, Quinton-
Brown (2013: 262) distinguishes between two types of states contesting R2P, rejectionists and 
cautious supporters, respectively. On one hand, R2P rejectionists are defined as states using 
rhetorical means to criticize R2P. On the other hand, cautious supporters are referred to as 
states expressing partial support to R2P. Quinton-Brown (2013: 265) lists six different themes 
around which R2P is criticized. These themes are namely the politicization, misuse and abuse 
of R2P, the issue of traditional sovereignty and non-interference, the aversion towards the use 
of force, the denunciation of a postcolonial form of ideology, the illegitimacy of the Security 
Council, and early warning deficiencies. Ziegler (2015: 2) acknowledges that although it has 
been successful in socializing the most reluctant states on the issue into accepting that 
sovereignty implies the obligation to respect basic human rights principles, R2P remains at 
the second stage of normative progress and is far from being fully internalized by the 
international community. Finally, Ziegler (2015: 18) specifies that the contestation of R2P is 
essentially divided into two main categories, diverging interpretations of state sovereignty and 
suspicion towards Western states concerning R2P implementation. 
In sum, the academic debate on R2P has focused on whether this concept represented 
a concrete departure from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention that had been prevalent 
during the 1990s. Scholars have welcomed the fact that R2P could make humanitarian 
intervention and sovereignty compatible within the framework of the UN Charter and that it 
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emphasized that the highest degree of responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities 
lies with the state. Nevertheless, academics have shown their concern towards the lack of 
detail concerning the practical issues revolving around R2P. Critics have emphasized R2P’s 
inefficiency in ensuring that the words used in the Summit outcome document translate into 
concrete acts on the ground. Scholar skeptical about R2P argue that this is explained by the 
fact that states have divergent interpretations of the concept, leaving it open to politicization 
and misuse by states. 
B) Research Gap 
The review of the academic literature published on the topic substantiates an 
abundance of research on the normative features and shortcomings of R2P. Scholars have 
issued robust conclusions suggesting that R2P has already reached the stages of norm 
emergence and norm cascade on Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998) scale of international norm 
dynamics (Rademkaer, 2012; Welsh, 2013; Ziegler, 2015). Given R2P’s rapid rise along these 
two stages, the question of whether it has reached the stage of internalization remains. This 
thesis attempts to purvey the research gap by measuring the levels of support for R2P among 
the permanent members of the Security Council. In the light of their ability to veto the norm’s 
implementation, the support of such states is crucial towards R2P’s normative progress on the 
international stage. By analyzing the positions of permanent member states in the past decade 
of R2P’s existence, this research’s findings will contribute to the assessment of whether R2P 
has reached the stage of internalization. Complementary analysis will provide an explanation 
as to why R2P has presently succeeded or failed to reach this particular stage. 
C) Theoretical Framework 
This thesis aims at assessing the progress of the R2P norm through the constructivist 
theoretical framework of the norm ‘life cycle’. In the context of the examination of R2P’s 
normative progress, constructivism is the most appropriate theory to examine the 
aforementioned research questions. Although related to geopolitical interests, the debate 
revolving around R2P remains essentially articulated around two key normative concepts, 
state sovereignty and human rights. Neo-realism would not provide an adequate theoretical 
perspective to answer my research question because it conceives states as unitary actors with 
preferences driven by relative-power and material gain. From an alternative angle, liberalism 
would be an interesting theory to articulate an argument around the concepts of the 
democratic peace theory or the implications of liberal humanitarian intervention but remains 
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unable to account for the inter-subjective behavior of states and the manner in which their 
preferences change (Chandler, 2012). Checkel (1997: 473) recalls that while liberal scholars 
consider that norms can modify the incentives of actors, which in turn constrain their behavior 
accordingly, constructivists privilege the perspective of norms as common understandings 
from which the identity and interests of actors are built. In this way, constructivism 
distinguishes itself as the theoretical perspective that is most adapted to examine R2P’s 
international norm dynamics because takes into account that norms, human agency and 
contingent events have a considerable impact on actor-behavior in international politics 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895-6).  
Scholars have issued varying definitions of what constitutes a norm. Krasner (1982: 
186) defines norms as ‘standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations’. 
Finnemore (1996: 22) adopts an equally succinct definition of norms as ‘shared expectations 
about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors’. Raymond (1997: 128-129) 
conceives international norms as ‘generalized standards of conduct that delineate the scope of 
a state’s entitlements, the extent of its obligations, and the range of its jurisdiction. They are a 
medium through which commonly held expectations about what is appropriate behavior in 
various situations are conveyed to members of the state system’. Björkdahl (2002: 15-16) 
distinguishes two broad types of norms, namely regulative and constitutive norms. Whereas 
regulative norms are prescriptive rules that issue rights and obligations in the aim of ordering 
behavior, constitutive norms are intrinsically related to the identity and interests of social 
actors. In this way, the latter determine whether these specific actors or groups of actors are 
recognized as sharing a collective identity and a common set of interests.  
This thesis will use the theoretical lens produced by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, although other scholars have developed theories in the field of norm advancement 
theory using the framework of the norm life-cycle (Sandholtz, 2008; Krook & True, 2010; 
Acharya, 2014). For reasons of consistency, Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998: 891) definition of 
norms as ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ is used 
throughout this thesis. According to the authors of ‘International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change’, norms are particularly relevant in world politics because they have a 
systematic impact on behavior. For this reason, Finnemore & Sikkink (1998: 894) argue that 
‘idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicle for system transformation’. To go further in 
their analysis of how norms influence behavior and may find themselves in the position of 
being a driver of political change, the authors coined the concept of the norm ‘life cycle’ 
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(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895). Accordingly, the three successive stages of a norm’s 
potential life cycle are firstly ‘norm emergence’, then ‘norm cascade’ and finally, 
‘internalization’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 898). Acharya (2014: 405) concurs by arguing 
that the creation of a particular norm does involve multitudes of actors and is impacted by the 
issues and context around which it arises. 
Scholarly literature on the topic (Welsh, 2013: 379; Acharya, 2014: 406) highlights 
that, as opposed to static concepts, norms are subject to processes that shape them over time. 
Therefore, it can be considered that as opposed to enjoying a linear development, the 
diffusion of norms is characterized by a fluctuating process of norm contestation where each 
agent attempts to shape the norm’s meaning according to its own preferences. Chandler 
(2012: 229) further underlines the necessity to consider that norm dynamics can be impacted 
not only endogenously but also in an exogenous manner. This theoretical observation 
therefore underlines the necessity to examine both internal processes as well as external 
events impacting norm dynamics. Krook & True (2010: 109-111) distinguish two patterns of 
norm dynamics, internal dynamism and external dynamism. On one hand, the internal 
dynamism of norms is intrinsically related to the prospects for norm contestation between 
agents to shape the content and significance of norms. This process of norm contestation may 
lead to the redefinition of existing norms, or even the emergence of new ones. Finally, 
processes of ongoing contestation between agents for the norm’s meaning can have varying 
consequences as the norm’s dynamic may be expanded, ignored, or even reversed. On the 
other hand, a norm’s external dynamism emerges from the wider context surrounding it, 
which is also referred to as its ‘normative environment’ (Krook & True, 2010: 110). 
Accordingly, this environment can offer space for agreement, innovation, or contestation 
around the norm. This framework of analysis is in turn useful to determine whether the 
external context surrounding the norm is likely to cause it to be expanded, ignored, or 
reversed.  
According to Finnemore & Sikkink (1998:896), norms are promoted by so called 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ who develop strong notions of what constitutes appropriate behavior in 
international politics. Norm entrepreneurs are essential in the stage of norm emergence 
because they raise awareness around issues and ‘frame’ an international debate around them. 
The goal of norm entrepreneurs is ‘to secure the support of state actors to endorse their norms 
and make norm socialization a part of their agenda (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 900). 
‘Framing’ has been defined by Keck & Sikkink (1999: 90) as to ‘mobilize information 
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strategically to help create new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressurize, and gain 
leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments’. Norm entrepreneurs are 
usually associated with individuals but they can also take the shape of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) or transnational advocacy networks. Notwithstanding, Ambrosetti 
(2010) warns that the success of norm entrepreneurs in promoting abstract ideas at the 
domestic or international level does not always solely depend on public scrutiny facing 
decision makers. Indeed, Ambrosetti (2010: 170) highlights that intra-professional social 
sanctions impact the success of norm entrepreneurship, especially in bureaucratic systems 
such as the United Nations. In this way, Ambrosetti (2010: 171) concludes that the lack of 
shared conceptions between decision makers of how to implement norms creates additional 
obstacles for the latter to be put into practice. 
Keck & Sikkink (1999: 91) argue that transnational advocacy networks ‘frame’ to 
raise awareness among selected publics, urge governments and other stakeholders to act, and 
press for institutionalization. In a similar fashion, states also attempt to use interaction 
mechanisms that conform to their normative background. Indeed, Krook & True (2010: 111) 
argue that actors develop deliberate strategies so as to attach a particular significance to norms 
in order to suit their particular identities, perceptions and preferences. In a similar fashion, 
Raymond et al. (2014: 198) have coined the terms of ‘normative reframing’ and ‘normative 
innovation’. The first term designates a situation where ‘advocates promote new institutional 
rules as being supported by an alternative existing social model’. The second expression 
relates to when ‘agents of change create and promote alternative institutional arrangements, 
both formal and informal’.  
This assumption led scholars to attribute different behavioral patterns to states 
according to whether they were leading or emerging powers. Xuetong (2011) argues that 
hegemonic states use three different interaction mechanisms. Firstly, hegemonic powers use 
an ‘example-imitation’ interactive model implying that other states copy the behavior of the 
leading state because they perceive it as a factor in achieving successful development 
(Xuetong, 2011: 241). Secondly, the ‘support-reinforcement’ model asserts that hegemonic 
states choose to provide assistance to states acting in conformity with norms they approve of 
in order to encourage non-complying states to join this particular normative behaviour 
(Xuetong, 2011: 242). Thirdly, the ‘punishment-maintenance’ model explains that a 
hegemonic power decides to repress states that deviate from norms advocated by that very 
hegemonic state in order to redress the behavior of these specific states, discouraging further 
Jérémie Speiser The International Norm Dynamics of R2P June 10th 2015 
 
 15 
non-compliance towards that norm (Xuetong, 2011: 243). Xuetong (2011: 245) explains that 
hegemonic states display a strong tendency of focusing on norm diffusion among their allies. 
Finally, Xuetong (2011: 245) argues that hegemonic powers also tend to promote ‘double-
standard norms’, leading them to pressure states to adopt norms that they do not comply with 
themselves.  
Other scholars have focused on the behavior of emerging powers relative to norm 
diffusion (Acharya, 2011; Xiaoyu 2012). Accordingly, Xiaoyu (2012: 365) makes the 
assumption that emerging countries tend to adhere to some international norms while 
attempting to reshape others, turning norm diffusion into a ‘two-way process’. On one hand, 
emerging powers are ‘norm-takers’ in order to perpetuate an image of themselves as 
responsible stakeholders within the international system. On the other hand, emerging states 
are ‘norm-makers’ when they perceive themselves as capable of challenging the normative 
assumptions of the hegemonic system. The latter behavior has been described as norm 
subsidiarity, which Acharya (2011: 97) defines as the ‘process whereby local actors create 
rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by 
more powerful central actors’. It has to be noted that norm subsidiarity is distinguished from 
the concept of norm localization, which is defined as ‘a complex process and outcome by 
which norm-takers build congruence between transnational norms […] and local beliefs and 
practices’ (Acharya, 2004: 241). The theories discussed in this paragraph all derive from the 
assumption that the adhesion, rejection, or indifference of states towards international norms 
is fluctuating according to the identity, perceptions, and preferences developed by each 
specific state as well as their continued interaction with other states.  
The fluctuating nature of norm diffusion implies that following their emergence norms 
can break through in order to obtain the adherence of a wider amount of states. The tipping 
point between the stages of norm emergence and norm cascade happens when norm 
entrepreneurs have convinced a sufficient amount of states to support and adopt their norm. 
The theoretical framework suggests that a tipping point is reached when approximately one 
third of states in the international system adopt the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 901). 
After the tipping point has been attained and the stage of norm cascade begun, Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998: 902) argue that more states start adopting the norm at a higher pace due to an 
‘active process of international socialization intended to induce norm breakers into norm 
followers’ . At the second stage of the norm ‘life cycle’, this socialization mechanism is 
comparable to a system of ‘peer-pressure’ where norm entrepreneurs use appropriate 
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organizational platforms in order to pressure targeted states to adopt the norm through the 
application of new laws and policies or treaty ratification. Finnemore & Sikkink (1998: 902) 
also recognize that during the stage of norm cascade, norm adoption becomes part of an 
identification process that states use to be perceived as part of an international society. 
The last stage of the norm ‘life cycle’ is when actors have internalized the norm until 
the point where they consider the norm as taken for granted and conform to it in automatic 
fashion (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 904). Finally, Finnemore & Sikkink (1998: 906) 
propose several criteria to determine the likelihood whether a certain norm can go through 
each and every stage towards internalization. These criteria are domestic legitimacy of states, 
the prominence of the states or organizations promoting the norm, the intrinsic qualities of the 
norm, and its proximity to pre-existing normative components.  
Finally, Panke & Petersohn (2011) argue that international norms may disappear under 
particular circumstances. Accordingly, international norms degenerate if there are actors who 
challenge it and no central enforcement authorities such as states or international 
organizations willing or capable to punish non-compliance (Panke & Petersohn, 2011: 721). 
The speed of norm degeneration is impacted by the precision of the norm’s definition as well 
as the stability of the international context surrounding the norm. Norms are more likely to 
degenerate quickly when their definition is precise and are surrounded by an unstable 
international environment. Norms are more likely to degenerate slowly if their definition 
remains imprecise and are accompanied by a stable international context. In the end, the 
degeneration of international norms either leads them to be substituted by rival norms or to 
disappear in the mere absence of competing norms (Panke & Petersohn, 2011: 723-726).    
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
A) Methodology 
This thesis will use the methodology of political discourse analysis in order to 
examine the content of official government statements made by the permanent members of 
the Security Council, also known as ‘P5’ states. The result of this analysis is set to determine 
each of the P5’s level of support for R2P along three possible categories. These categories are 
‘strong supporter’, ‘cautious supporter’, and ‘rejectionist’ (Quinton-Brown, 2013). Strong 
supporters are states that express public support for R2P in principle and practice. Strong 
supporters of R2P pressure other states to join in full support of the norm. Cautious supporters 
are states that express public support for R2P in principle but disagree with the way in which 
it is currently being implemented. Cautious supporters demand changes in the way R2P is put 
into practice before displaying full adherence to the norm. Rejectionists are states that 
repudiate R2P in both principle and practice. Rejectionists show no sign of support for R2P 
and express utmost dissatisfaction towards R2P in both principle and practice. 
 
 
 Strong Supporter Cautious Supporter Rejectionist 
Level of Support: Subscribes to R2P as 
formulated in the 2005 
World Summit.  
Publically supports R2P 
as a principle. 
Supports R2P 
implementation without 
reservations, including in 
cases involving the use 
of force. 
Subscribes to R2P as 
formulated in the 
2005 World Summit. 
Publically supports 
R2P as a principle. 
Support of R2P is 
nuanced by strong 
reservations on 
R2P’s interpretation 
and implementation. 
Rejects R2P as 
formulated in the 
2005 World Summit. 
Publically calls for 
R2P to be revoked. 
Criticizes R2P as an 
illegitimate principle 
and a source of abuse 
of the political 
sovereignty of states. 
Table 1: Categories of state levels of support for R2P  
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My application of this methodology will rely on the framework outlined by Fairclough 
& Fairclough (2012) in their book, Political Discourse Analysis. More specifically, I will 
extract information from these sources by basing myself on Fairclough & Fairclough’s 
(2012:45-8) structure of practical arguments. This thesis will identify distinct yet inter-linked 
components of political discourse in order to better analyze the claims for action, goals, 
values and circumstances invoked by the representatives and delegations of the permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council on R2P in the official speeches, reports, and 
interviews analyzed in this thesis. The latter methodology is particularly useful to distinguish 
the values and motives invoked by actors in their statements. Therefore, the structure of 
practical reasoning presented by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 48) also assists this thesis in 
distinguishing the claims for action, goals, and circumstances mentioned in the official 
statements from P5 states to the General Assembly in the framework of the dialogue on R2P.  
The position of each of the five permanent member states of the Security Council will 
be analyzed according to a timeline composed of three distinct timeframes. The first 
timeframe goes from June 1st 2005 and the beginning of the negotiations of the 2005 World 
Summit until 12th January 2009, when Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon released his first 
report on R2P, which opened the debate on R2P within the UN General Assembly on a yearly 
basis (Ban, 2009). The first timeframe examines the positions of the respective P5 states 
during the 2005 World Summit, including this event’s negotiations phase, and the vote on 
Security Council Resolution 1674 on April 28th 2006. The second timeframe goes from 
January 12th, 2009 until 17th March 2011 and the vote of Security Council resolution 1973, 
which authorizes NATO’s Operation Unified Protector designed to implement R2P in Libya. 
The elements examined in this timeframe are the P5’s respective stances on R2P during the 
General Assembly debate and their positions concerning the vote on resolution 1973. The 
third timeframe goes from March 17th 2011 until the present. The elements investigated in this 
timeframe are the P5’s respective positions on the manner in which NATO’s intervention in 
Libya was carried out, their stance on intervening in Syria for R2P reasons, as well as their 
discourse on R2P during the General Assembly debates on R2P.  
The aim of this timeline will be to provide an analysis of each of the P5 states’ 
positions on R2P or R2P-related situations between three different phases. The first timeframe 
constitutes R2P’s institutionalization phase where the principle becomes unanimously 
endorsed at the 2005 World Summit and reaffirmed by Security Council resolution 1674 in 
2006. The analysis conducted within this timeframe aims to determine each of the P5’s initial 
Jérémie Speiser The International Norm Dynamics of R2P June 10th 2015 
 
 19 
perspectives on R2P’s institutionalization in the outcome of the 2005 World Summit. This 
includes those aspects of the concept P5 states wanted to include or withdraw from the 
outcome document of the World Summit, and their position on R2P’s appearance for the first 
time in a Security Council document, as happened in the case of resolution 1674. As part of 
the second timeframe, the research aims to determine each of the P5’s positions on R2P at a 
time when the discussion on R2P switched to a more comprehensive debate designed to 
specify under which conditions R2P was to be implemented. Therefore, research in this 
timeframe will focus on determining the P5’s different points of view concerning prevention 
and the use of force in R2P situations. Research in the second timeframe is also set to analyze 
the P5’s position on resolution 1973, which set a precedent by authorizing the use of force for 
R2P reasons for the first time, and allowed the demonstration of the R2P principle in practice 
in the case of NATO’s intervention in Libya. The third timeframe is set to research whether 
P5 states modified their stance on R2P following its demonstration in Libya and more 
importantly, measure their level of support for R2P following this event. In order to assess the 
latter, research within this timeframe will focus on the P5’s statements within the General 
Assembly debate on R2P as well as on their position concerning the question of intervening in 
Syria on the grounds of R2P. 
 
 
 
 Timeframe 1 Timeframe 2 Timeframe 3 
Period: June 2005 - January 
2009 
January 2009 - March 
2011  
March 2011 - Present  
Elements 
analyzed: 
P5’s positions in:  
- 2005 World Summit 
negotiations. 
- Security Council vote 
on resolution 1674. 
P5’s positions in: 
- General Assembly 
debate on R2P. 
- Security Council vote 
on resolution 1973. 
P5’s positions in: 
- General Assembly 
debate on R2P. 
- Discussions on 
intervening in Syria on 
R2P grounds. 
Questions 
asked: 
What are the P5’s initial 
positions concerning the 
institutionalization of 
R2P? 
What are the P5’s 
positions concerning the 
implementation of R2P? 
What are the P5’s levels 
of support for R2P 
following its 
implementation in 
Libya?  
Table 2: Research Timeline 
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This thesis uses government statements and reports made by representatives of the 
United States, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, 
and France in the framework of the dialogue on R2P taking place within the General 
Assembly of the United Nations since 2009. This thesis will use statements made in 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 by the aforementioned states.1  
B) Hypotheses & Expectations 
The empirical analysis will need to demonstrate that R2P is strongly supported by 
each of the P5 states and widely accepted by them as a habitual procedure in order to 
conclude that R2P has reached the stage of internalization. This implies that at that particular 
stage, the substance and quality of the R2P norm should be uncontested among state actors. 
R2P can be deemed to have reached the stage of internalization if the practice and intrinsic 
values of the norm as well as its interpretation are unquestioned. In addition, R2P is 
internalized if the states unrestrictedly accept and support it so as to conform to the usual 
standards and practices of civilian protection in events of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This also means that the application of peer-pressure 
by a majority of states on outliers that do not support or conform to the R2P norm is a further 
sign of internalization. It can also be considered that R2P is internalized if the norm has 
enjoyed repeated application over the past decade.  
The empirical analysis will focus on whether R2P has reached the stage of 
internalization. In view of the unmatched importance of the five UN Security Council 
permanent member states in providing a legal basis in authorizing the practice of R2P, these 
states are the unit of analysis in this section. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the actors’ 
perception of a norm as being habitual behavior in world politics is an essential feature of a 
norm’s internalization process. Consequently, Security Council states are the most relevant 
actors to observe in the frame of this research because R2P cannot be put into practice on a 
comprehensive and regular basis without their approval. In this way, the analysis will 
examine in the respective cases of the United States, the Russian Federation, the People’s 
Republic of China, the United Kingdom and France to what extent these states have 
internalized R2P. To conduct my research on this particular stage, the analysis will rely on 
                                                
1 These documents can be found on the following website: 
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/government-statements-on-rtop  
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official statements made by these states at the General Assembly, United Nations and 
government reports, as well as interviews of state representatives.  
This thesis will observe whether NATO’s operation Unified Protector resulted in some 
P5 states adopting a ‘permissive’ or ‘restrictive’ interpretation of R2P and whether some of 
these P5 states publicly embrace or reject the norm in its current form.  A permissive 
interpretation of R2P tends to be displayed by states considering that there is a moral 
obligation for states to intervene in cases of crimes against humanity. This includes the 
necessity to engage in coercive intervention within the territory of the relevant state with or 
without the approval of formal bodies such as the Security Council or regional organizations 
if the emergency of the situation requires it. States having a restrictive interpretation of R2P 
emphasize the importance to abide by UN Charter based rules such as refraining from the 
threat or use of force, and that coercive interventions on the grounds of R2P need to be 
conducted with the consent of the host state. This section’s analysis also relies on academic 
literature focusing on the attitudes of P5 states towards R2P following the institutionalization 
of the norm to complement my research. In accordance with Finnemore & Sikkink’s (1998) 
theoretical framework, this section’s analysis will consider that the stage of internalization 
will only be reached if the UN Security Council permanent member states have taken R2P for 
granted and unquestionably conform to it. 
Several alternative paths are to be considered if R2P has not yet reached the stage of 
internalization. If this stage has not been reached for reasons of ongoing debate between P5 
states on conceptual matters related to R2P’s practical aspects, then it means that R2P’s 
normative progress remains confronted by norm contestation between the norm’s main 
stakeholders within the Security Council. In this situation, norm contestation can still benefit 
the diffusion of R2P since further debate is likely to push P5 states to reach a consensus on 
the way in which R2P should be implemented. Should norm contestation yield no tangible 
consensus between the permanent members of the Security Council, another alternative 
scenario can be norm degeneration. If the Security Council remains a deadlocked institution 
in making R2P a functioning principle, there is the hypothetical scenario where the norm 
could degenerate until its complete disappearance. The conjunction between a lack of 
conceptual progress in the political debates on R2P and the lack of consensus on when states 
should yield responsibility to protect civilians to the international community is likely to 
result in protracted discussions within the Security Council. As it may become a source of 
standstill rather than concerted action, Security Council paralysis in R2P situations may 
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delegitimize the norm in the long-term as states could perceive R2P as a false solution to 
urgent humanitarian crises. In sum, three tangible yet very different scenarios may unfold 
concerning R2P’s normative progress. Either R2P is internalized as a norm by the permanent 
member states of the Security Council, either these states pursue the discussions on 
conceptual matters related to R2P implementation in order to reach a consensus, or these 
states lose interest in the norm as they deem that it did not yield the expected results in 
solving the problem of international inaction in cases of crimes against humanity.  
Different factors could account for the scenario of R2P reaching the stage of 
internalization. For instance, the presence of a hegemonic actor that supports R2P within the 
Security Council would have the potential to encourage states to adhere to the norm for fear 
of sanctions, desire for rewards, or to simply follow the example set by the hegemonic state 
(Xuetong, 2011). Alternatively, developing states within the Security Council such as China 
and Russia could act as ‘norm takers’ and provide strong support to R2P in order to be 
perceived as responsible stakeholders by the rest of the international community. By this 
logic, these states could engage themselves in the process of making their domestic practices 
adhere to the norm by protecting civilians within their borders at risk of being victims of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (Acharya, 2004). The 
argument that norm localization could be a factor explaining Russia and China’s potentially 
strong support for R2P nevertheless rests on the assumption that these states will not misuse 
the process in a selective manner, serving their domestic interests under cover of artificially 
complying with the norm. 
The factors that could possibly explain why R2P has not reached the stage of 
internalization are all linked with potential contestation of the norm. States dissatisfied with 
the norm could use norm subsidiarity as a strategy to challenge R2P and promote an 
alternative set of normative assumptions that conforms to their identities, interests, and 
preferences (Acharya, 2011: 97). Another hypothetical explanation for the scenario in which 
R2P could not reach the stage of internalization is the persistence of the contestation of the 
norm within the Security Council. This contestation may include criticism emphasizing R2P’s 
potential for misuse, its interference with the territorial sovereignty of states, the aversion 
towards the use of force in international relations, the perspective of R2P as a postcolonial 
concept, or early warning deficiencies (Quinton-Brown, 2013: 265). 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis 
A) United Kingdom 
During the negotiations of the 2005 World Summit, the United Kingdom supported the 
institutionalization of R2P. The British position that there needs to be a principle emphasizing 
the importance of preserving civilian lives from crimes against humanity has been shaped by 
the events that led to the United Kingdom’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Prime Minister 
Anthony Blair delivered a speech at the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999 that 
emphasized the necessity for the international community to react in the face of the 
perpetration of genocide and crimes against humanity. The speech, dubbed as the ‘Blair 
doctrine’ was delivered as follows: 
‘We live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. By 
necessity we have to cooperate with each other across nations. Many of our 
domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world… We are all 
internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to participate in 
global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in 
other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and 
the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure… 
Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter’ (Bellamy, 2009a: 25). 
This allocution, in a similar fashion to Francis Deng’s concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility acknowledges that the international community bears the duty to stop turning a 
blind eye to crimes against humanity wherever they are committed, but also that it carries the 
responsibility to not let such crimes happen unchecked. This position remained the United 
Kingdom’s during the negotiations preceding the 2005 World Summit, where British 
diplomats attempted to persuade reluctant representatives of developing states belonging to 
the G77 and the non-aligned movement (NAM) to mention R2P within the final declaration 
(Bellamy, 2009a: 89).  The United Kingdom’s support for R2P continued in the aftermath of 
the World Summit, with London and Paris joining efforts in pushing the Security Council to 
adopt resolution 1674. Adopted in April 2006, resolution 1674 provided additional legitimacy 
to R2P by recalling that the Security Council: 
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‘4. Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ 
S/RES/1674 (2006). 
During the first timeframe, which as a reminder is between 21st July 2009 and 30th 
October 2011, the United Kingdom demonstrated further support for making R2P an 
operational principle. After having welcomed Ban Ki-Moon’s report Implementing the 
responsibility to protect published earlier in 2009, the United Kingdom’s final remarks at the 
first-ever General Dialogue on R2P were unequivocally supportive of the concept: 
‘I will conclude by saying a little about what I think we should be trying to 
achieve here, that is an R2P-culture, a culture of prevention that is as much about 
responsible sovereignty as it is international assistance. A culture that in the long-
term will help us to prevent mass atrocities and reduce conflict and the cost of 
conflict. A culture that will help us to build an international system which is better 
equipped and more effective at preventing and responding to conflict. A culture 
which fosters our ability to reach consensus on timely and decisive action. I don’t 
think anyone here would disagree with those goals. And I very much hope that 
none would seek to delay implementation through procedural or administrative 
means. This is too important to us all – we made a commitment in 2005, a 
commitment to practical action. We must now live up to that’ (United Kingdom 
Mission to the United Nations, 2009). 
The United Kingdom is doing more than simply conveying its agreement with R2P as a 
concept in this statement. By calling for the establishment of a ‘R2P-culture’, London is 
encouraging other states to make the protection of civilians from mass crimes an every-day 
priority. The use of the term ‘R2P-culture’ is significant as it implies that the concept should 
become habitual and unquestioned behavior among UN member states. Additionally, Britain 
is warning other member states that they should not try to obstruct the process of R2P 
implementation in the light of the engagement they took at the World Summit. Two years 
later in 2011, the United Kingdom issued a position endorsing ‘the continued efforts to refine 
and to implement the principle of responsible sovereignty, which is the corollary of the 
principle of responsible sovereignty’ (United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 2011). 
From a theoretical perspective, the British General Assembly statements illustrate that 
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London has attempted to trigger a behavior categorized by Xuetong (2011: 241) as the 
‘example-imitation’ interactive model. By calling on states to respect what they agreed upon 
in 2005 and urging them not to obstruct R2P implementation, the United Kingdom is 
pressuring other states to follow its example by fully adhering to R2P and considering it as a 
concept they ought to put into practice as soon as possible in exchange of tangible benefits in 
terms of worldwide civilian protection. 
The second timeframe running from 17th March 2011 until present is indicative of 
whether NATO’s intervention in Libya modified the United Kingdom’s perspective on R2P. 
The position of the government of the United Kingdom remained consistent with the one it 
displayed during the first timeframe. It led the efforts alongside France and the United States 
to submit draft resolutions to the Security Council advocating an intervention to protect 
civilians in Libya. The results of these efforts were resolutions 1970 and 1973 providing 
NATO with a mandate to establish a no-fly zone over Libya’s aerial territory. London’s 
stance remained supportive of an active implementation of the R2P concept and diplomats in 
the Foreign Office were convinced that NATO’s intervention in Libya was an example of its 
successful demonstration. In a General Assembly statement on 5th September 2012, almost a 
year after the end of the operation, a British representative at the UN defended NATO’s 
intervention in Libya in the following terms: 
‘On Libya, we believe the UN Security Council-mandated action taken by NATO 
was necessary, legal and morally right. By taking prompt action, the UN Security 
Council and NATO saved tens of thousands of people from becoming victims of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (United Kingdom Mission to the United 
Nations, 2012). 
Although NATO’s operation Unified Protector saw the participation of British soldiers, 
materiel, and logistics, London found it more difficult to convey the credibility of its 
humanitarian message to its domestic public. As a consequence of the United Kingdom’s 
participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the British public was divided between their 
government’s calls to save civilians in Tripoli and Benghazi from Qaddafi’s wrath and the 
memory of their country’s illegal violation of a third state’s territorial sovereignty for dubious 
motives. A poll issued by Ipsos MORI in April 2011 reveals that fifty percent of the British 
public supported David Cameron’s decision to intervene in Libya while forty-nine percent 
opposed it (Latter, 2011). Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry on the reasons that informed Blair’s 
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decision to participate in the Iraq war were ongoing at the time of the events and made the 
British public wary towards having their country reproduce the same mistakes of eight years 
earlier.   
An illustration that the implementation of R2P in Libya has not modified the United 
Kingdom’s position on the concept is London’s stance on the ongoing conflict in Syria. The 
United Kingdom has pushed for coercive intervention alongside France and the United States 
in the case of Syria by submitting four draft resolutions on the situation to the Security 
Council between 2011 and 2014. The United Kingdom’s support for coercive intervention in 
Syria conducted on the grounds of R2P is apparent in the following statement: 
‘The overwhelming majority vote in favor of the UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Syria on 3rd August 2012 sent a clear statement that the world 
condemns escalating violence and human rights violations by the Syrian regime. 
But the collective response by the international community to the situation in 
Syria has been thwarted by a lack of consensus in the United Nations Security 
Council. We reiterate the call for all members of the Security Council to shoulder 
their responsibility in taking the decisive action required to compel the Assad 
regime to cease the violence and engage in a political process’ (United Kingdom 
Mission to the United Nations, 2012). 
In the years that followed, statements issued by the representatives of the United Kingdom to 
the General Assembly conveyed a similar message, highlighting that the controversy that 
surrounded Qaddafi’s death in the final stage of NATO’s intervention in Libya did nothing to 
change London’s position on R2P. In 2013, the United Kingdom declared that ‘the situation 
in Syria […] is a clear example of where the state has failed to protect its citizens’ (United 
Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, 2013). One year later, the British representative to 
the General Assembly stated that ‘the situations in Syria and Iraq, where hundreds and 
thousands have been killed and minority groups persecuted, highlight the need for the 
international community to stand firm and take decisive action’ (United Kingdom Mission to 
the United Nations, 2014). The British government’s stance on R2P has to be nuanced by the 
lack of support for R2P it could generate from its domestic public. In this way, David 
Cameron’s proposition to intervene in Syria following the alleged use of chemical weapons 
was denied by the House of Commons in late August 2013. 
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In conformity with the ‘Blair doctrine’ of liberal interventionism and its desire to lead 
an ‘ethical foreign policy’, London has promoted the implementation of R2P’s three pillars at 
the highest level of the United Nations system throughout the timeline of this research 
(Brockmeier et al., 2014: 432). This is illustrated by the United Kingdom’s political discourse 
on R2P, which focuses on the moral necessity of working towards protecting civilians. 
Notably, the British Foreign Office interprets R2P in a permissive way, as it has applied 
sanctions and coercive intervention on the grounds of R2P in the case of Libya. London has 
also put diplomatic pressure on other states to adhere to R2P in the Security Council by 
submitting several draft resolutions to implement R2P in Syria, and exhorted states in the 
General Assembly to live up to the commitment they made at the 2005 World Summit. Last 
but not least, the United Kingdom’s call to establish a ‘R2P culture’, suggests its desire to 
turn R2P into a habitual and unquestioned means of protecting civilians from crimes against 
humanity. Therefore, it can be concluded that the United Kingdom is a strong supporter of 
R2P.  
B) France 
During the negotiations leading up to the 2005 World Summit, France’s position was 
to support R2P (Bellamy, 2006: 152). France’s stance on this issue was informed by its 
participation in two large-scale humanitarian interventions the previous decade. The French 
army launched Operation Turquoise in June 1994 in order to stabilize Rwanda and attempt to 
halt the ongoing genocide that had taken place in the country. Despite its controversial 
reception because of France’s role in training and equipping parts of the Hutu-dominated 
army that perpetrated mass killings and the relatively late arrival of its troops to halt the 
genocide, the French intervention was primarily justified for humanitarian motives. In this 
regard, French Prime Minister Alain Juppé wrote in a news column that France ‘had a real 
duty to intervene in Rwanda… to put an end to the massacres and protect the populations 
threatened with extermination’ (Wheeler, 2000: 231). In 1999, France also joined the NATO 
coalition that intervened in order to protect civilians in Kosovo from ethnic cleansing.  The 
French position on the R2P norm is rooted in the concept of droit d’ingérence (the right to 
humanitarian interference) coined by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner in 
the mid-1990s. This term has advocated a broad and permissive interpretation of humanitarian 
intervention, which is presently still to be found in the Quai d’Orsay’s conception of R2P. 
France has continued its efforts to make R2P ready for practice and pushed to legitimate it in 
the years following the World Summit. As already mentioned, Paris has taken initiative 
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alongside London to promote resolution 1674, reaffirming the Security Council’s 
commitment to R2P (Brockmeier et al., 2014: 440). 
When entering the second timeframe, France was a strong supporter of R2P as it issued 
full public support for the norm’s implementation. In a statement to the General Assembly in 
2009, France encouraged other states to further their efforts to make R2P an operational 
concept. As such, French representative to the UN Jean-Pierre Lacroix declared: 
‘The responsibility to protect already largely exists; our heads of state and 
government recognized it as a universal principle nearly four years ago. We are 
therefore meeting not to discuss the definition of the concept, but rather to debate 
the means to strengthen its implementation and its respect’ (Permanent Mission of 
France to the United Nations, 2009).  
As France considers R2P to be institutionally embedded within the United Nations system, its 
stated objective for the further discussion of the norm within the General Assembly is to 
improve the procedure of R2P implementation along its three pillars. In 2009, the French 
representative to the UN spoke out to the General Assembly in the following terms: 
‘The responsibility to protect is certainly not only the response to a crisis 
situation, its success depends on the ability of all of us to strengthen the 
prevention of mass crimes. But the responsibility to protect would not be 
complete without the third pillar that gives it its meaning – that is the international 
community’s reaction when one of the four crimes is about to be or is being 
committed’ (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2009).  
The latter quote particularly shows that France fully adhered to R2P in both principle and 
practice as it underlines the importance of both prevention and action to protect civilians from 
crimes against humanity. France’s political discourse on R2P is based around the respect for 
human rights and good governance. France also gives a prime importance to international law 
as an institutional barrier preventing R2P crimes to take place. France particularly promotes 
the respect for ‘human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law’ 
(Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2009).  In this manner, France considers 
that international legal institutions such as the International Criminal Court are essential to 
guarantee that R2P crimes do not go unpunished and has pushed UN member to complete the 
ratification process of the Rome Statute (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 
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2011). France attempts in this way to locate R2P within a network of international institutions 
fighting impunity against genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing. France conveys the message that R2P is an integral piece within the wider puzzle 
of international law. France’s strategy of framing R2P further legitimizes the concept and 
brings a sense that all UN member states ought to become norm followers in the spirit of 
international law, while norm breakers isolate themselves from the rest of the international 
community.   
Concerning the situation in Libya during the Arab Spring, the French government was 
an unmitigated supporter of humanitarian intervention on the grounds of R2P. France, as 
mentioned above, submitted alongside the United Kingdom the drafts that led to Security 
Council resolution 1970 and 1973 calling for and authorizing the international community to 
protect civilians in Libya. In a joint effort with the United Kingdom, France took a leading 
role within the NATO coalition performing Operation Unified Protector by providing troops, 
logistics, and materiel to the mission, notably by mobilizing its aircraft carrier, the Charles de 
Gaulle. For France, R2P effectively stood the test of demonstration in the case of Libya. Paris 
considers Operation Unified Protector as much of a success as the other peacekeeping 
operations it had recently been involved in on the African continent. French representative to 
the UN Gérard Araud declared at the General Assembly that ‘in Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, 
and Kenya, the international community stood up to its responsibilities and effectively 
prevented atrocities’ (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2013). The French 
public did not receive their country’s role in Libya with as much hostility as in the United 
Kingdom. According to an Ipsos MORI poll released in April 2011, sixty-three percent of the 
French public expressed support for Operation Unified Protector (Latter, 2011). This could be 
due to the fact that as opposed to the British political system, the French president, as head of 
the armed forces, is the sole decider when it comes to war. This prevented heated debates 
taking place within the Assemblée Nationale. Careful attention had also been paid by French 
media, political, and intellectual circles towards promoting the intervention in Libya as an act 
to defend human rights. Last but not least, France had not taken part in the intervention in Iraq 
in 2003 and the public’s reaction towards intervention in Libya was therefore tainted with less 
suspicion than in the case of the United Kingdom and the United States. Consequently, 
NATO’s intervention in Libya did little to modify France’s position of support towards R2P. 
As it remained an advocate of R2P in both principle and practice after NATO’s 
intervention has ended, France spent the third timeframe in support of coercive intervention 
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against the Assad regime in the case of mass crimes in Syria. Although France shares a 
similar position within the Security Council as the United States and the United Kingdom, it 
has been confronted by Russia and China’s reluctance to implement R2P’s third pillar in 
Syria. In the context of the use of chemical weapons in Syria in late August 2013, France 
attempted to apply diplomatic pressure on the international community in order to react to this 
atrocity. French representative Gérard Araud declared in front of the General Assembly: 
‘The Syrian government is in the process of murdering its own people. More than 
100,000 people have died. The Syrian government, while showing complete 
indifference, used its air assets and then artillery against civilian neighborhoods, 
in violation of international humanitarian law, and is now using chemical 
weapons. It first of all tested the waters by using them in a limited way. It’s now 
using them on a massive scale, meetings focusing on “never again” will do 
absolutely nothing to respond to the brutality of a regime that wants to murder its 
own people’ (O’Donnell, 2014: 575). 
France has also been at the forefront of combating gridlock within the Security Council 
(O’Donnell, 2014: 576). It acted accordingly by proposing its permanent members to 
collective restraint in their use of veto in cases of mass crimes, a suggestion originally 
included in the ICISS report on R2P. On this topic, French representative François Delattre 
stated: 
‘When mass atrocities are committed, the Council must not add to the failure of 
prevention by failing to act. In Syria, four double vetoes did not allow us to take 
the necessary preventive measures and to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes. This is why France is working with its partners in 
order to regulate the use of the veto in cases of mass crimes, in the framework of a 
voluntary and collective commitment of the Permanent Members’ (Permanent 
Mission of France to the United Nations, 2014). 
In sum, France supports R2P’s in both principle and practice. Throughout its speeches 
to the General Assembly, France has shown its adherence to values of human rights, good 
governance, and responsible sovereignty in pressuring states to live up to their responsibility 
to protect their own citizens from R2P crimes. Furthermore, France has called for states to 
improve R2P prevention by empowering international justice and regional organizations as 
well as creating local mechanisms of conflict prevention on their domestic territory. France 
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has been a supporter of coercive intervention by the international community in cases of R2P 
crimes so as to implement the concept’s third pillar. Last but not least, France urged other 
permanent Security Council to be more responsible in their veto uses in such situations. In 
view of the above, France’s position on R2P can be qualified as being one of strong support. 
C) The United States 
Six months before the World Summit, the United States brought up their own version 
of the concept of responsible sovereignty with the 2005 National Defense Strategy stating that 
‘it is unacceptable for regimes to use the principle of sovereignty as a shield behind which 
they can claim to be free to engage in activities that put enormous threats to their citizens, 
neighbors, or the rest of the international community’ (Bellamy, 2009a: 24). Washington’s 
conception of responsible sovereignty differed from the one originally issued by Francis Deng 
in the sense that it did not only focus on state responsibility towards respecting human rights 
but also the responsibility of states to cooperate against terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. In the light of the United States’ intervention in Iraq, this stance 
attracted skepticism from the international community. Many developing states feared that 
under this perspective, R2P could be misused as a vehicle for foreign interference in their 
domestic affairs.  
During the negotiations leading up to the 2005 World Summit, the United States 
adopted a position that reflected the prevailing influence of neo-conservative policymakers 
within the Bush administration. Washington opposed any criteria that could govern or restrict 
its decision-making concerning the use of force. American ambassador to the UN John Bolton 
expressed his country’s view that the primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with the 
state whereas the international community, although eligible to act, would not be legally 
obliged to do so (Bellamy, 2009a: 86). The United States was also against the ICISS 
suggestion that P5 states should refrain from vetoing Security Council resolutions in R2P 
situations. In the same vein, the United States joined the United Kingdom in arguing that 
interventions should not require Security Council authorization in urgent situations. This 
position was in marked contrast with the one adopted by developing countries of the G77 and 
the non-aligned movement, which advocated the necessity for any intervention on the grounds 
of R2P to be approved by the Security Council. Although the final draft that was to be 
submitted for endorsement at the summit did not satisfy Bolton on the issue of Security 
Council authorization, US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice decided to overrule him by 
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approving the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document following a discussion with General 
Assembly President Jean Ping, who was in charge of the negotiations (Bellamy, 2009a: 90). 
The United States’ approval of this document was confirmed as it voted in favor of 
Resolution 1674, which reaffirmed the Security Council’s commitment towards R2P. 
With the arrival of Barack Obama in the White House in 2009, the US president’s 
foreign policy preferences resulted in the United States increasing its support for R2P. During 
the second timeframe, Washington’s speeches on R2P in the framework of the General 
Assembly have greatly emphasized the importance of prevention and early warning 
mechanisms in order to avoid mass crimes on a large scale. In this aspect, the United States 
has called for the increase in means provided to the United Nation’s mediation teams (United 
States Mission to the United Nations, 2009). Furthermore, the Obama administration has 
proved to be particularly proactive on this front by creating the U.S. Atrocities Prevention 
Board. In this way, the Genocide Prevention Task Force was created in 2009. Importantly, 
this body issued a recommendation that the permanent members of the Security Council 
should commonly consider to renouncing their use of veto in R2P situations (Reinold, 2011: 
81). The institutionalization of the Atrocity Prevention Agenda notably shows the extent to 
which US policymakers have made the prevention of crimes against humanity a priority in 
US national security and foreign policy (Junk, 2014: 551). The United States remain 
relatively cautious concerning coercive interventions on the grounds of R2P as it does not 
want it to create a legally binding obligation for the international community to intervene in 
situations of grave humanitarian distress. US ambassador to the UN Rosemary DiCarlo’s 
statement to the General Assembly adequately illustrates Washington’s position on R2P: 
‘Where prevention fails, and a state is manifestly failing to meet its obligations, 
we also need to be prepared to consider a wider range of collective measures. 
Only rarely, and in extremis, would these include the use of force’ (United States 
Mission to the United Nations, 2009). 
This declaration mirrors that in 2009, although the United States supported R2P in principle, 
it wished to maintain decision-making over coercive intervention on a case-by-case basis. In 
view of preserving full-control over its use of force, Washington wanted to avoid R2P 
resulting in a legal obligation for the United States to mobilize troops in cases of crimes 
against humanity (Rotmann et al., 2014: 365). The context around which this statement was 
issued explains the caution displayed by the United States concerning the use of force. 
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Rosemary DiCarlo’s declaration was pronounced during the first General Assembly debate on 
R2P. Consequently, the United States’ position should not be interpreted as restrictive 
towards the use of force on R2P grounds but rather as a reminder to other delegations that the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document did not include a clause legally binding the 
international community to conduct coercive intervention in R2P situations. In light of the 
support brought to R2P’s three pillars and the efforts made by the Obama administration to 
strengthen preventive measures, the United States can be considered to have been a strong 
supporter of the concept during the second timeframe of this research. 
The humanitarian crisis in Libya is a compelling case to determine whether the first 
demonstration of the use of force on R2P grounds would change Washington’s position on 
R2P. In this case, the United States voted in favor of Security Council resolutions 1970 and 
1973, respectively placing sanctions on the Qaddafi regime, and authorizing a no-fly zone to 
protect over Libya in order to protect civilians. Furthermore, the United States’ support for 
coercive intervention for R2P reasons was illustrated by the US army providing the NATO 
coalition with logistical and intelligence resources.  It was the explicit nature of Qaddafi’s 
threats towards his civilian population that convinced the Obama administration to support 
R2P implementation in Libya (Chesterman, 2011: 282). Significantly, the United States has 
used R2P language to justify the necessity to intervene. For example, a legal advisor of the 
State Department is quoted as saying that ‘Qaddafi has forfeited his responsibility to protect 
his own citizens and created a serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and 
protection’ (O’Donnell, 2014: 566). The United States’ decision to avoid direct involvement 
of its troops in the implementation of the no-fly zone over Libya is nuanced by the lack of 
domestic support and the stretched military resources that confronted Washington at the time. 
The American public perceived military interventions with skepticism since the 2003 Iraq war 
(Junk, 2014: 536). Additionally in the spring of 2011, US armed forces were still stationed in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, which made the Obama administration reluctant to open a third 
front in the Middle East. The United States’ stance on R2P therefore remained one of strong 
support, as US Ambassador to the UN Rick Barton was adamant about the way the 
international community had implemented R2P in Libya: 
‘The Security Council’s decisive action in Libya shows the progress we have 
made in learning from our past failures to prevent mass atrocity crimes and in 
living up to the aspirations we set for ourselves under Responsibility to Protect’ 
(United States Mission to the United Nations, 2012). 
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The United States’ position on the humanitarian crisis in Syria further illustrates that 
Washington’s present stance on R2P remains one of strong support. Shortly after the use of 
chemical weapons was observed in Syria in late August 2013, US Ambassador Samantha 
Power declared at the General Assembly on R2P: 
‘All attacks on civilians are an outrage that should shock the conscience. We must 
also recognize that the use of chemical weapons crosses a line. These weapons are 
particularly grotesque, efficient, and indiscriminate. Their use cannot be 
reconciled with basic of humanity that apply, even in wartime’ (United States 
Mission to the United Nations, 2013). 
References to R2P were only used sparingly by the US government in the media 
campaign to advocate the use of coercive intervention to protect civilians against mass crimes 
following the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In what could be perceived as being an act of 
‘normative reframing’, the United States was careful to refrain from using R2P vocabulary 
when urging the international community to react because it feared that this would trigger 
skepticism among the American public (Raymond, 2014: 198). In this particular case, 
President Obama has defined the use of chemical weapons against civilians as a ‘red line’ 
(O’Donnell, 2014: 572). As R2P-terminology had not been used to call for action to protect 
civilians, the United States willingness to intervene in Syria could not be translated into 
action. This was notably due to Washington’s reliance on two-level politics in its foreign 
policy. In this manner, it is both the absence of international consensus within the Security 
Council and the lack of domestic support shown by the United States Senate that prevented 
the Obama administration to intervene in Syria on the grounds of R2P (Junk, 2014: 551).  
The United States’ position on R2P between 2005 and the present has not been as 
consistent as the stances displayed by France and the United Kingdom. During the first 
timeframe, the Bush administration received R2P with reluctance. This was notably the case 
concerning the question of establishing criteria on the use of force. Nevertheless, after having 
decided to support the concept in principle, the United States took a posture of active support 
for R2P under the Obama administration in the second timeframe of this research. The efforts 
made by the United States to create institutions supporting the prevention of crimes against 
humanity such as the Genocide Prevention Task Force and the Atrocity Prevention Agenda 
demonstrate Washington’s willingness to make R2P a working principle. The United States’ 
calls to intervene in Libya and Syria for R2P reasons confirm that the United States consider 
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R2P as a principle that should govern states’ behavior in the international system. For 
instance, US ambassador to the UN spoke about R2P as a ‘normative concept’ in front of the 
General Assembly (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2014). In view of its 
position on R2P during the second and third timeframes, the United States can be considered 
as a strong supporter of R2P.   
D) Russia 
Russia’s position on R2P before the 2005 World Summit was one of cautious support. 
The Kremlin recognized the humanitarian motives that underpinned R2P but issued 
interrogations concerning the concept’s implementation. NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 
Kosovo without the Security Council’s authorization has influenced Moscow’s initial position 
on R2P. At the time, Russia was going through a period of political stagnation. Therefore, 
Moscow perceived NATO bombings as a Western attempt to take advantage of those 
difficulties to extend their sphere of influence in the region at Russia’s own expense. The 
Russian Federation saw NATO’s operation in Kosovo as a case of American hegemonic 
appetite under cover of humanitarian pretexts. Under this perspective, the Kremlin feared that 
the United States could potentially threaten to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs by calling 
for intervention in Chechnya for humanitarian motives without the Security Council’s 
approval (Evans, 2008 a: 73). Moscow’s worries increased during the years of 2003 and 2004 
with the United States’ invasion of Iraq and the pro-Western colored revolutions that took 
place in Georgia and Ukraine. A statement of former Russian Prime Minister Primakov best 
illustrates the Kremlin’s interrogations on R2P one year prior to the 2005 World Summit: 
‘We face leaders whose policies result in hundreds of thousands, if not millions of 
starving, persecuted refugees, in armed clashes with neighboring states, and in 
attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. It is true that in many such cases, 
human rights and the interests of peace and security cease to be purely a state’s 
internal affairs. Mass violations of human rights and security demand a reaction 
from the world community, including the possible use of force. But how and in 
what form? Based on international law or despite it? (Ziegler, 2015: 7). 
Russia recognized the humanitarian concerns addressed by R2P. Yet, two main issues 
drove Moscow’s position during the negotiations leading to the summit. The Kremlin 
opposed the possibility of military action being conducted without the Security Council’s 
approval and did not want the inclusion of criteria governing the use of force in R2P 
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situations in the outcome document. Overall, Russia was reluctant about R2P becoming 
institutionalized as it considered that it could weaken the UN Charter with that text already 
having adequate clauses to address humanitarian crises. In the final stages of the negotiation, 
the appearance of a clause specifying that the use of force on R2P grounds has to be 
authorized by the Security Council resulted in Russia’s approval of R2P being included in the 
final declaration provided that the conditions for the concept’s implementation would be 
discussed further in the summit’s aftermath  (Bellamy, 2009a: 87). In the following year, 
policymakers in Moscow remained cautious on the question of providing additional support 
to R2P by reaffirming the principle in the Security Council. Russia considered the potential 
for R2P to be interpreted in a subjective manner to be too great for it to be put into practice 
immediately.  Russia’s ambassador to the Security Council Igor Rogachev stated: 
‘We believe that it is clearly premature to advance that concept in Security 
Council documents. We all remember well the complex compromise that was 
required to reflect that issue in the 2005 Summit Outcome document. […] We 
need to have a detailed discussion in the General Assembly of the issue of the 
responsibility to protect before we can discuss its implementation’ (Bellamy, 
2009a: 136). 
Russia initially planned to vote against resolution 1674 along with China. However, a 
compromise resulted in China’s decision of voting in favor of the text, which in turn 
pressured Russia to vote in favor of the resolution in order not to appear isolated on this issue 
(Bellamy, 2009a: 137). 
Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 constitutes an illustration of the extent of 
Moscow’s recognition of the R2P principle in the years following the World Summit. In this 
case, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov invoked the necessity for Russia to 
intervene to protect its citizens so as to justify the Kremlin’s use of force in Georgian 
territory, with President Medvedev referring several times to the term ‘genocide’ (Kurowska, 
2014: 500). Although this intervention had been widely condemned by the international 
community, one of Russia’s statements to the General Assembly debate on R2P referred to its 
‘legitimate right to self-defense’ in this particular situation (The Permanent Mission of the 
Russian Federation to the United Nations, 2011). The fact that Moscow attempted to 
legitimize its action on the grounds of protecting its citizens is a sign of the Kremlin’s implicit 
acknowledgement of coercive intervention for R2P reasons as being acceptable practice, yet 
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only when its own geopolitical interests are not compromised. From a theoretical standpoint, 
this example constitutes a case of norm localization with Moscow selectively seizing a 
foreign concept to frame this event according to its domestic interests, notably through 
political discourse (Acharya, 2004: 245). Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 can be 
explained from a similar theoretical perspective with Moscow justifying this decision with the 
necessity to protect Russian speaking minorities as well as reminding the international 
community of its long-standing cultural ties with the region (Kurowska, 2014: 502). 
Russia’s invocation of R2P to use force in Georgia can be considered as selective 
because of the fact that Russian policymakers did not modify their cautious discourse on the 
international stage. The stance of Russian ambassador to the UN Margelov to the first General 
Assembly debate on R2P in 2009 mirrors the Kremlin official position three years earlier: 
‘The concept of the responsibility to protect has enormous potential for change. 
Its development and implementation could significantly shape key trends that will 
determine the future of the entire system of international relations and the 
international rule of law. That is precisely why we are convinced that we should 
be measured and cautious in addressing any idea regarding implementation of the 
authoritative and relevant ideas of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document on 
the responsibility to protect’ (The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to 
the United Nations, 2009). 
The Russian Federation adheres to a restrictive interpretation of R2P that consists of a literal 
interpretation of Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit outcome document. Russia’s 
perspective on R2P is strongly driven by the primacy it places on international law and the 
Charter-based system (O’Donnell, 2014: 577). Accordingly, Russia adopts a strict reading of 
international law because it considers it as the main barrier protecting less politically 
influential and militarily strong states from external interference (Rotmann et al., 2014: 371). 
Furthermore, Russia’s perspective on R2P is rooted in the Kremlin’s adherence to pluralist 
values and the perception that the international community should favor the coexistence of 
different political regimes in order to obtain a stable world order (O’Donnell, 2014: 577). 
Russia’s stance on R2P is described as a ‘nuanced position’ (Kurowska, 2014: 490). Indeed, 
the first two R2P pillars on the responsibility of states to protect their population and 
preventive measures do not represent a cause for concern for Russia (Ziegler, 2014: 8). 
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Nevertheless, Russia remains extremely cautious concerning R2P’s third pillar referring to the 
use of force by the international community after all peaceful means have been exhausted.   
Russia’s position on R2P encountered a crucial test in the case of the 2011 Libyan 
crisis. Moscow’s stance, which was to recognize the necessity of preventing crimes against 
humanity while expressing caution towards conducting coercive intervention in R2P 
situations was to be stretched during the early stages of the crisis. Although it did not 
participate in the operation itself, the Kremlin initially tolerated NATO’s intervention in 
Libya by abstaining during the vote of Security Council Resolution 1973. Russia did not 
oppose coercive intervention in the first place because the situation of humanitarian distress in 
Libya was exceptionally clear-cut as Qaddafi issued extermination threats towards civilians 
early on in the civil war, and the regional organizations such as the Arab League had given 
approval for an intervention to take place (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 608). This decision was 
subject to a heated debate within the Kremlin, with Putin, then Prime Minister, openly 
criticizing President Medvedev’s decision to contribute to the West’s ‘medieval call for a 
crusade’ (Kurowska, 2014: 501). The manner in which NATO implemented R2P in Libya 
was subject to Moscow’s condemnations already in the early stages of Operation Unified 
Protector. Denouncing the occurrence of civilian casualties in the framework of the 
intervention, Russia stated: 
‘any use of force by the coalition in Libya should be carried out in strict 
compliance with Resolution 1973. Any act going beyond the mandate established 
by that resolution in any way or any disproportionate use of force is unacceptable’ 
(Bellamy & Williams, 2011: 845). 
In the eyes of Putin, Qaddafi’s death shortly before the end of NATO’s intervention in 
Libya definitely sealed Medvedev’s decision of abstaining on resolution 1973 as a mistake 
not to be repeated.  The perception that NATO contravened its mandate to use force by 
fostering regime change in Libya hardened Russia’s stance on R2P. For example, the 2013 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept considers  
‘It is unacceptable that military intervention and other forms of interference from 
without which undermine the foundations of international law based on the 
principle of sovereign equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of 
implementing the concept of “R2P”’ (Ziegler, 2015: 9). 
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During the third timeframe, the Kremlin’s toughened position on R2P was to be further 
illustrated by Russia joining China in vetoing four successive draft Security Council 
resolutions on the situation in Syria since 2011. Shortly before his election as President in 
2012, Putin went on to declare ‘No one should be allowed to employ the Libyan scenario in 
Syria’ (Ziegler, 2015: 14). The events of Libya did not lead Russia to reject R2P as a whole 
however. Instead, Moscow opted for a strategy of ‘norm subsidiarity’. This strategy was 
characterized by Russian support for the norm of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ coined by 
Brazil, which advocates the establishment of mechanisms verifying that the conduct of 
interventions on R2P grounds conform to their relevant Security Council mandate (The 
Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 2012).  
In sum, Russia’s position on R2P is nuanced in the light of its attachments to the 
principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. On one hand, Russia 
supports R2P’s first two pillars, as they are compatible with the stipulations of the UN 
Charter concerning the prohibition on the use of force.  On the other hand, Russia has largely 
sought to avoid the practice of coercive intervention under R2P’s third pillar, as it remains 
concerned that the latter is affected by politicized abuses and the lack of criteria on the use of 
force. The Kremlin’s fears in this regard culminated in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s death 
during NATO’s intervention in Libya, an event that toughened Russia’s stance on the use of 
force on R2P grounds. Yet, the fact that Russia invoked R2P during the 2008 Georgian crisis, 
however selectively, illustrates that it recognizes R2P’s legitimacy in the international order. 
These reasons lead to the conclusion that Russia is a ‘cautious supporter’ of R2P. Moscow’s 
interaction with the norm suggests that R2P internalization within policy-making ranks in the 
Kremlin is reliant on the future development of the norm, notably through its continued 
discussion at the General Assembly. 
E) China 
Two main issues drive China’s position on R2P during the negotiations of the 2005 
World Summit. Firstly, China put forward the necessity that R2P operate along the lines of 
the UN Charter. The importance Beijing places on the UN Charter on the question of R2P is 
explained by the fact it sees it as a guarantee protecting the principles of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of sovereign states and the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
proclaimed in article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. Secondly, China wants to preserve the Security 
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Council’s role as the only institutional body bearing the responsibility of authorizing the use 
of force. At the World Summit, President Hu Jintao stated: 
‘The purposes and principles of the UN Charter are crucial to safeguarding world 
peace and security. They have been widely recognized as the basic norms 
governing international relations and must be complied with in real earnest. As 
the special agency of the UN responsible for maintaining world peace and 
security, the Security Council must be given the authority to carry out its 
mandate’ (Bellamy, 2009a: 87). 
The fact that both of China’s main concerns related to R2P were addressed within the 
summit’s outcome document led the country to support the institutionalization of the concept. 
From a theoretical point of view, China’s endorsement of R2P in 2005 can be considered to 
be as an illustration of norm containment. Beijing using a strategy of norm containment 
implies that it becomes willing to support a norm in order to better control its future 
development and suit it to its own preferences (Prantl & Nakano, 2011: 214; Garwood-
Gowers, 2012: 381). In 2006, China’s stance on resolution 1674 confirmed its willingness to 
engage with R2P so as to make it conform its interests. Initially reluctant to have R2P 
mentioned in a Security Council resolution, China negotiated with the United Kingdom, the 
proponent of the draft, to limit the declaration to a mere reaffirmation of what had been 
agreed upon at the World Summit (Bellamy, 2009a: 137). Realizing the potential changes that 
a refinement of R2P’s contours by the Security Council could bring concerning the principles 
of non-interference and the prohibition on the use of force, Beijing wanted to ensure that no 
new elements would be brought to the R2P that had been agreed upon one year earlier.  
When the first General Assembly debate on R2P took place in 2009, China’s stance on 
R2P remained consistent with the position it held on the concept in the previous years. During 
the debate, Beijing emphasized that R2P had to be considered within the wider framework 
governed by the UN Charter. China’s representative to the General Assembly declared: 
‘When a crisis involving one of the four crimes emerges, to ease and curtail the 
crisis will be the common aspiration and legitimate demand on the part of the 
international community. But the relevant actions must strictly abide by the 
provisions of the UN Charter, and respect the views of the government and 
regional organizations concerned. The crisis must be addressed in the framework 
of the UN, and all peaceful means must be exhausted. It is necessary to prevent 
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any state from unilaterally implementing R2P. […] The prerequisite for [the 
Security Council] taking action is the existence of “any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression”. The Council must consider R2P in the broader 
context of maintaining international peace and security, and must guard against 
abusing the concept’ (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
United Nations, 2009). 
China is not questioning whether the international community should intervene in protecting 
civilians confronting these core crimes, but rather the way in which R2P should be 
implemented. More particularly, China has been an advocate of the first two pillars of R2P 
rather than being a proponent of coercive military interventions (Teitt, 2011: 308). Aside from 
recalling Beijing’s cautious reading of the concept along the lines of the UN Charter, the 
statement reveals the importance China places on the agreement of the host state and of 
regional organizations in the use of force for R2P reasons. China advocates that states, as 
primary bearers of the responsibility to protect civilians on their territory, should be able to 
authorize or discard interventions within their borders because of the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. However, this position can also be 
explained by Beijing’s concerns that its treatment of minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang might 
provide a case for international action within Chinese borders. China emphasizes the 
importance of regional organizations as gatekeepers against the misuse of the R2P concept 
such as unilateral interventions. This position has been particularly influenced by past 
experience, as China did not approve of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which was 
devoid of Security Council authorization (Wheeler, 2000: 272). Finally, the fact that China’s 
representative considers that ‘R2P so far remains a concept’ that ‘does not constitute a rule of 
international law’ illustrates Beijing’s will to contain R2P as a principle located on the fringes 
of the wider Charter-based system (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to 
the United Nations, 2009). 
China’s position on R2P did not change in the case of a humanitarian crisis in Libya in 
2011. Although China abstained on resolution 1973, it nevertheless expressed deep 
reservations concerning the mandate given by the Security Council for NATO’s intervention.  
Chinese representative Li Baodong clarified his country’s position on the resolution in a 
statement to the Security Council: 
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‘China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution. Meanwhile, China 
attaches great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League 
on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. We also attach great importance 
to the position of African countries and the African Union. In view of this, and 
considering the special circumstances surrounding the situation in Libya, China 
abstained from the voting on resolution 1973’ (UN Security Council, 2011: S/PV. 
6498). 
This declaration illustrates that rather than departing from its initial position on R2P, China’s 
abstention adheres to the stance it had held so far. In conformity with the importance Beijing 
placed on regional organizations as gatekeepers against R2P misuse, the Arab League’s 
approval of resolution 1973 was essential in China’s decision to refrain from using its veto in 
the case of Libya. In addition, the immediacy of the threat issued by Qaddafi on his civilian 
pressured China not to form an obstacle from intervening in a situation with potentially sordid 
consequences. These ‘special circumstances’ referred to by Li Baodong underlined the 
exceptional nature of the situation, which meant that China did not want to consider 
resolution 1973 as a template for future cases of R2P implementation (Garwood-Gowers, 
2012: 387). Alongside Moscow, Beijing perceived Qaddafi’s death in the streets of Sirte as a 
case of regime change, with NATO abusing the mandate it had been conferred by the Security 
Council to protect civilians in Libya. This event noticeably toughened China’s stance on the 
use of force in R2P situations in the third timeframe of this research. In the aftermath of 
Operation Unified Protector, Chinese Foreign Minister Le Yusheng said:    
‘We should not forget the lessons we have learnt from Libya. On the first 
“protection” day led by NATO in Libya, there were 64 civilians killed and 150 
injured. And the final result of the “protection” is that over 20,000 civilians killed 
and 900,000 displaced. […] It has been vividly described as “a successful 
operation with a dead patient” and it is patent that this kind of “protection” is a 
failed and irresponsible one applying “protect” as the cover of the brutal 
“intervention”. The courage to say “No” to it absolutely demonstrates our 
determination to be responsible. We respect “Responsibility to Protect” and at the 
same time we value “Responsibility while Protecting” even more’ Liu & Zhang, 
2014: 418-419). 
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During the General Assembly debate on R2P in 2012, China refers to ‘Responsibility while 
Protecting’ in the attempt to promote the norm created by Brazil that addresses the lack of 
monitoring and accountability of R2P interventions as experienced in the case of NATO’s 
intervention in Libya (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations, 2012). The latter demonstrates that China, along with other BRIC states, engages in a 
strategy of norm subsidiarity in order to contain and shape R2P’s development along its own 
perspective.  In this fashion, Beijing aims to spread a worldview emphasizing territorial 
integrity as well as non-interference in order to limit Western influence in developing 
countries (Van der Putten, 2013). China’s hardened stance on R2P has resulted in the 
deadlock of the Security Council on the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Alongside the Kremlin, 
Beijing vetoed four resolutions on this situation between 2011 and 2014. China’s objection to 
pass these resolutions is linked to its aversion of a repetition of the Libyan scenario in Syria. 
A quote of Chinese Ambassador Chen Shiqiu is unequivocal in this regard: 
‘If the Syrian tragedy was taken as a humanitarian disaster, how should we 
understand the fact that the opposing faction was provided with weapons? 
Therefore, it seems that it was not meant to terminate the conflict, but to topple 
the Bashar al-Assad administration and turn Syria into a second Libya’ (Liu & 
Zhang, 2014: 419). 
In conclusion, China qualifies as a state that is a ‘cautious supporter’ of R2P in the 
sense that its statements at the General Assembly debates on R2P express partial, as opposed 
to total, support for the norm. Indeed, China has demonstrated support for the first two pillars 
of R2P and has encouraged the continuation of the debate on the norm within the framework 
of the General Assembly. However, Beijing remains prudent in its interpretation of R2P and 
advocates that its implementation strictly abides to the limits imposed by the UN Charter. 
China’s abstention in the situation of Libya demonstrated that it did not reject the use of force 
in R2P situations outright. The latter case increased China’s wariness towards the abuse of 
R2P, hardening its stance on the use of coercive intervention in R2P situations such as Syria. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Results 
The Security Council is currently divided on the issue of R2P. The United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States provide strong support to R2P while Russia and China are 
cautious supporters. As illustrated by the absence of convergence between permanent member 
states of the Security Council on the topic of R2P implementation, R2P remains a contested 
norm. Since the Security Council is the only body that is able to legitimately authorize the use 
of force in international relations, the use of force under R2P’s third pillar is unlikely to be 
regularly practiced unless a common understanding is reached by the P5 on this issue. Far 
from being considered as habitual or unquestioned practice to protect civilians from crimes 
against humanity, R2P remains confined to the stage of norm cascade and fails to reach the 
stage of internalization. Although all P5 states agree on the implications brought up by R2P’s 
first two pillars on state responsibility to protect their population and preventive action to 
avert R2P crimes, the issue of coercive intervention remains subject to ample disagreement 
within the Security Council. Significantly, this means that R2P in its integral form is not yet 
taken for granted by the P5. As the Security Council bear the responsibility to authorize the 
use of force, the legal implementation of coercive intervention under R2P will remain subject 
to mutual agreement between P5-states until a common understanding on all the aspects 
involved in R2P have been reached. This currently prevents R2P from being considered as a 
habitual and unquestioned form of civilian protection from crimes against humanity. For these 
reasons, R2P cannot be considered to have reached the stage of internalization as of yet.  
Why did R2P not reach the stage of internalization? 
This result can be explained by the evolution of the Russian and Chinese positions on 
R2P during the timeline of this research. Both countries’ concerns on R2P were initially 
related to conceptual matters. In the first timeframe, Moscow and Beijing expressed wariness 
towards the possibility for R2P to undermine UN Charter principles of non-interference in the 
affairs of a sovereign state and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. 
The wording of paragraphs 138 and 139 addressed these conceptual issues, which allowed 
Russia and China to support R2P in principle by endorsing the 2005 World Summit outcome 
document. Both states’ concerns that R2P could be abused and misused concerning the use of 
force by self-interested states using civilian protection as a motive for interfering in the 
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domestic affairs of sovereign states was still present during the first two timeframes of this 
research. At first glance, Russia and China displayed reluctance towards the use of force in 
the case of Libya. Yet, the Arab League support for intervention and the immediacy of 
Qaddafi’s threat to civilians influenced both countries’ decision to abstain on resolution 1973. 
To Moscow and Beijing’s distaste, NATO’s ensuing operation resulted in a disproportionate 
amount of civilian casualties and regime change in Tripoli. Russia and China considered that 
their initial wariness about R2P had been confirmed by the case of Libya, which lead to the 
hardening of Moscow and Beijing’s positions on the use of force in R2P situations. Therefore, 
R2P not reaching the stage of internalization can be explained by Russian and Chinese 
unwillingness to use force in R2P situations based on the past experience of Libya. In the 
third timeframe Moscow and Beijing’s contestation of the use of force on R2P grounds 
includes criticism concerning the norm’s abuse, misuse and politicization, as well as its 
potential to infringe the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign 
states, and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations (Quinton-Brown, 2013: 
265). 
In conclusion, the current stage of normative development reached by R2P remains at 
the stage of norm cascade. Less than a decade following its inception by Francis Deng, the 
idea that state sovereignty conferred heads of state with the responsibility to protect their 
citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing has taken 
the form of an institutionalized principle at the 2005 World Summit. Nevertheless, R2P’s 
institutionalization does not represent an end in itself as the principle is entirely based on 
practice. Due to the protracted nature that surrounded its negotiation, the summit’s outcome 
document does not provide specific guidelines concerning the use of military force in order to 
implement R2P. Consequently, this means that R2P’s further progression towards 
internalization will be subject to an international consensus on coercive intervention and R2P. 
More specifically, this means that states will have to agree on which thresholds and modes of 
operations apply to the use of R2P’s third pillar. As recently witnessed in the case of Syria, 
the importance of Security Council permanent member states remain crucial as any dissent 
concerning R2P and coercive intervention within this institution is likely to lead towards 
protracted reactions from the international community to R2P crimes. 
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Implications 
In the absence of R2P rejectionists within the Security Council, the themes of 
contestation are all related to conceptual matters rather than institutional, ideological or 
technical disagreements (Quinton-Brown, 2013: 266). This leaves room for optimism as it 
implies that R2P’s accession to the stage of internalization depends on whether P5-states 
reach a consensus on the manner in which R2P’s third pillar is practiced. R2P is not facing 
norm degeneration. The process of narrowing down guidelines for R2P implementation 
advances on a yearly basis through the accumulation of debates on R2P hosted by the General 
Assembly and the Security Council as well as the publication of reports by United Nations 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Furthermore, less politically influent actors on the 
international stage have an important role to play in R2P’s normative development. It is 
possible for R2P to diffuse itself through the mobilization of states around the cause of 
civilian protection in formal and informal speeches, addresses, debates and conferences. 
Additionally, NGOs and high-profile personalities committed to the spread of human rights 
values play a crucial role in raising awareness among heads of state and their domestic 
constituencies. Finally, the International Criminal Court’s success in combating impunity in 
cases of R2P crimes is decisive in building a global consensus around the necessity for both 
states and the international community to uphold their responsibility to protect civilians from 
crimes against humanity. 
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